SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Hansen v. Board of
Trustees of Hamilton Southeastern Sch. Corp., No. 08-1205 (7th
Cir. Dec. 23, 2008)
School district could only be held liable under Title IX for teacher-student sexual harassment if it had actual notice of, and was deliberately indifferent to, the harassment.
Teacher engaged in a sexual relationship with student. When the relationship came to light, the school suspended the teacher, who later resigned after pleading guilty to sexual battery. The school’s investigation revealed that the teacher had engaged in two previous relationships with former students. The first relationship was with a former student who is now his wife. Both he and his wife claimed their relationship began only after she graduated. The second relationship began during the student’s high school years but was consummated only after she graduated.
The standard is not whether the school district should have known of the teacher’s misconduct and failed to respond appropriately. When a Title IX claim for damages against the educational institution is based on a teacher’s conduct, the plaintiff must prove that ‘an official of the school district who at a minimum has authority to institute corrective measures ... has actual notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the teacher’s misconduct.’”
The student had failed to present any evidence that school had actual knowledge of the teacher’s misconduct with herself or any other former student. Previously, the student had concealed her relationship with the teacher. Subsequently, however, the school took immediate action once informed. The court rejected the notion that the teacher’s marriage to a former student was in itself proof of misconduct.
FIRST AMENDMENT – FREE SPEECH
Mayer v. Monroe County
Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. 06-1993 (7th Cir. Jan. 24, 2007)
A public elementary school teacher’s free speech rights were not violated when she was prohibited from expressing her opinion of the war in Iraq during instructional time. During a class discussion of an article about peace marches in protest of U.S. military involvement in Iraq, a probationary teacher at the school, voiced the opinion that peace was preferable to war and said she personally supported the peace marchers. When parents complained, the school’s principal told all teachers to refrain from taking sides in political controversies in class. When the school district later failed to renew her contract, the teacher sued, alleging that the decision was based on her political expression and violated her First Amendment right to free speech.
The court held that the First Amendment "does not entitle primary and secondary teachers, when conducting the education of captive audiences, to cover topics, or advocate viewpoints, that depart from the curriculum adopted by the school system."
Samuelson v. LaPorte Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. 06-4351 (7th Cir. May 22, 2008)
A school coach failed to establish that the nonrenewal of his coaching contract was in retaliation for his having exercised his free speech rights. The court also ruled that the school district’s “chain of command” policy did not constitute impermissible prior restraint on his speech.
The athletic director and principal recommended nonrenewal of the coach’s contract based on: (1) complaints and unrest among players, parents and coaches; (2) the coach’s poor fundraising and unauthorized spending of team funds; and (3) his coaching ability.
In his resulting lawsuit, the coach cited four instances where he claims to have engaged in protected speech on a matter of public concern: (1) his speaking to the school board about the treatment of the girls’ sports programs as compared to the boys’ programs; (2) his voicing disapproval about the selection and hiring of a middle school principal; (3) his speaking to board members about proposed changes in the school’s computer platform; and (4) his speaking to a board member about his objections to a proposed school redistricting plan.
The court held that the “chain of command” policy was not an unconstitutional prior restraint on the freedom of speech because the policy covered only “speech grounded in the public employee’s professional duties” and not protected by the First Amendment. The court also held that the school had not retaliated against the coach’s exercise of a First Amendment right because, even if the district had been motivated partially by speech that was protected, the coach had not shown that the school’s stated reasons for the nonrenewal were pretextual.
AGE DISCRIMINATION
Filar v. Bd. of Educ. of
Chicago, No. 07-1275 (7th Cir. May 22, 2008)
A 69-year-old teacher’s Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) challenge to her reassignment from full-time teacher to roving substitute teacher was allowed to proceed after a failed motion for summary judgment. However, the court rejected the teacher’s claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
The teacher taught in the Polish bilingual program at the school in 1992. In the spring of 1999, the principal became aware that the school board would fund one fewer position in the Polish bilingual program the following school year. The principal had significant discretion to change teachers’ positions and level of seniority. There were two other teachers in the Polish bilingual program, who were born in 1957 and 1960, but they were more senior than the plaintiff.
The principal moved the plaintiff from a state-funded position to a board-funded position and immediately thereafter informed her that she would be reassigned, ostensibly because of her lower seniority and the lack of board funding.
Her new position as a substitute teacher would require her to fill positions at multiple attendance centers as they became vacant. The teacher requested that, because of an arthritic hip that inhibited her ability to walk, she instead be assigned to one of four schools she found acceptable because they were near bus stops.
While in some cases differences in seniority do prevent a “similarly situated” showing, the court reasoned, that is not necessarily the case where, as at the school, differences in seniority are determined entirely at the employer’s discretion. Since the three teachers had been teaching at the school for similar amounts of time, were similarly certified, had identical duties, and appeared to have received similar reviews, they were “similarly situated” for ADEA purposes. The appeals court went on to hold that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the principal had discriminated against the teacher based on age and remanded the case.
However, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling on the ADA claim. While acknowledging that the teacher was a “qualified individual with a disability” under the ADA, entitling her to a “reasonable accommodation” of her disability, the court did not believe her request to work as a substitute teacher at one school, rather than filling vacancies at any of the 116 Chicago public high schools as her position required, was “reasonable.”
NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND
Board of Educ. of Ottawa
Twp. High Sch. Dist. 140 v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., No. 07-2008
(7th Cir. Feb. 11, 2008)
The court affirmed the dismissal of a lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Education and the Illinois State Board of Education that alleged that the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) are legally incompatible. Two Illinois school boards and several special education students and their parents sought a declaratory judgment invalidating NCLB requirements for systemic remediation activities that necessitate modifying students' individualized education programs (IEPs) without any regard to the students’ individual needs. The district court held that the plaintiffs lacked legal standing.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but on different grounds. Although they had standing, the Seventh Circuit went on to conclude that “the plaintiffs’ claim is too weak to justify continued litigation.” Even if their assertion that NCLB and IDEA are irreconcilable in some respects is correct, the court determined, their argument that the earlier law, IDEA, can overrule the latter one, NCLB, “has time traveling in the wrong direction.” While conceding that it could not rule out the possibility that there might be some state or federal regulations that purport to rely on NCLB but that are not authorized under the act and are, therefore, barred by IDEA, the court emphasized that this lawsuit targeted NCLB as a whole. A federal court cannot forbid application of legislation enacted in 2001 just because it may undermine legislation enacted between 1970 and 1990. As a result, the court modified the judgment of the district court to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.